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A new US law allows warrantless wiretapping whenever 
one end of the communication is believed to be outside 
national borders. This creates serious security risks: 
danger of exploitation of the system by unauthorized 
users, danger of criminal misuse by trusted insiders, and 
danger of misuse by government agents.
I n August 2007, United States’ wiretapping law changed: the new Protect America Act permits warrantless foreign-intelligence wire-tapping from within the US of any communi-
cations believed to include a party located outside 
it. US systems for foreign intelligence surveillance 
located outside the United States minimize access to 
the traffic of US persons by virtue of their location. 
The new act could lead to surveillance on an unprec-
edented scale that will unavoidably intercept some 
purely domestic communications. A civil liberties 
concern is whether the act puts Americans at risk of 
spurious—and invasive—surveillance by their own 
government, whereas the security concern is wheth-
er the new law puts Americans at risk of illegitimate 
surveillance by others. 
 Building surveillance technologies into commu-
nication networks is risky. The Greeks learned this 
lesson the hard way; two years ago, they discovered 
that legally installed wiretapping software in a cell-
phone network had been surreptitiously enabled by 
parties unknown, resulting in the wiretapping of 
more than 100 senior members of the government for 
almost a year.1 Things are not much better in Italy, 
where a number of Telecom Italia employees have 
been arrested for illegal wiretapping (with attempts 
at blackmail).2 
In this article, we focus on security, not civil liber-
ties. If the intercept system is to work, it is important 
that the surveillance architecture not decrease the se-
curity of the US communications networks. Although 
we are writing about a US law and its consequences 
for the security of US communications, the examples 
of Greece and 
Italy make clear 
that the same issues occur internationally. 
Background
The combination of data sources may make this sur-
veillance more powerful—and create more risk—than 
was intended. We start with background on legal and 
policy issues, then technical concerns; this extensive 
background is necessary because architecture matters 
a lot, and in subtle ways.  
Legal and policy issues
US wiretap law has a long and complex history. (See 
the sidebar, “US wiretap law,” for a summary; other 
work has more details.3) Briefly, there are different 
standards and procedures for criminal versus national 
security wiretaps; in the latter case, so-called Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants can be 
issued for specific circumstances: 
any person in the US communicating via wire (the 
word “wire” includes fiber optics);
a US person (including US citizens, permanent 
residents, and US corporations)4 in the US whether 
communicating via wire or radio; and
any person in the US communicating via radio with 
people, all of whom are also in the US5 (the rules 
are, in fact, even more complicated, but this is suf-
ficient for our purposes).
Warrants are generally not needed to intercept radio 
communications.
•
•
•
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The Protect America Act (Public Law No. 110-55) 
dropped the warrant requirement for communica-
tions (over any medium) of US persons located in the 
United States with persons “reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States.”6 Modern commu-
nications technology—mobile phones, WiFi, and the 
Internet—often make it difficult to discern whether 
communication is from a location inside or outside 
the US, so the question is on what basis communica-
tions will be collected. In other words, there is an im-
portant distinction between the requirements of the 
law and what can be done with available technology.
Much of the motivation for changes to FISA arises 
from the geography of the world’s communications 
infrastructure combined with recent changes to tele-
communications technology. The US is a major hub 
in our communication-centered world, giving the 
National Security Agency (NSA), which is the US 
signals intelligence agency, significant opportunities 
for access to transit traffic. 
There are numerous reasons for US centrality in 
the world’s communications systems. One is cost: the 
US is the world’s leading economy, and fiber optic 
cables—how modern wired communications travel—
have been built installed between the US and overseas. 
With their economies of scale, these cables enable US 
providers to underbid regional carriers—for example, 
much of South America transits its traffic through 
Miami. Another reason is politics, which can lead to 
strange communication paths. For many years, com-
munications could not travel directly between Taiwan 
and the People’s Republic of China: calls traveled by 
way of Sacramento via AT&T lines. A third reason is 
the Internet. Many servers that are the very reason for 
communication—for example, Yahoo Mail, Hotmail, 
and Gmail—are in the US (although this is an ever-
decreasing percentage of the world’s mail servers, es-
pecially as China comes online).
At the time that FISA was written, communica-
tions satellites (radio) had revolutionized international 
communications. In subsequent decades, there was a 
major shift to fiber optic cables with a decreasing per-
centage of intercontinental communications traveling 
by radio. Thus the exemption allowing warrantless 
radio interception became increasingly less applicable. 
In recent years, the NSA has pressed to have the ex-
emption updated. While many in the field agree that 
there is plausibly a problem resulting from the intro-
duction of fiber optic cables, the Protect America Act 
went considerably further.
Collection
Signals intelligence is organized into a seven-step pro-
cess: access, collection, processing, exploitation, analy-
sis (intelligence analysis), reporting, and dissemination. 
The first three are of particular concern. Access is what 
happens at a radio, a fiber splitter, a tap on a wire, or a 
tap in a telephone switch. Collection is the process of 
recording signals for consideration. Recorded signals 
can be kept briefly or for very long periods.
Processing is shorthand for selecting the informa-
tion you want (and filtering out what you don’t). As 
in any learning process, if you can find information 
at all, you often have too much of it and must extract 
what interests you from what doesn’t. This is where 
the choice of architecture is significant, both in terms 
of minimizing data collection and in determining 
how the combination of data sources is used. We re-
turn to this point later.
Increasingly, communications are IP-based. The 
Internet is the interconnection of many networks, 
and these connections occur in various ways. For the 
largest networks, these form at peering connections: 
interconnections between administratively separate 
domains (such as ISPs). 
 International communications enter the US by 
satellite, terrestrial microwave, older copper cable, 
and newer fiber optic cable. There are roughly 25 
cable heads in the US. (This is an estimate based on 
Telegeography’s “Global Communications Cable and 
Satellite Map 2002,” which shows four cable heads 
on the Atlantic Coast and five on the Pacific. There 
are at least an additional five each coming terrestrially 
from Canada and Mexico.) At the cable head, incom-
ing signals split in several ways. First, the signals are 
sent via multiplexors and demultiplexors to the proper 
carriers (since most transoceanic fibers are owned by 
consortia of communications companies). Each carri-
er’s channels are further subdivided: voice signals are 
sent (perhaps via other gear) to phone switches, Inter-
net signals to routers, and so on.
A likely architecture
The NSA has not disclosed its surveillance architec-
ture, so it is impossible to know exactly how its system 
works. However, a current court case gives hints. In 
late 2005 and spring 2006, The New York Times and 
USA Today revealed that the NSA had been wiretap-
ping without warrants post-9/11. Shortly afterward, 
civil liberties groups and individuals sued AT&T over 
the “illegal spying of telephone and Internet com-
munications.” Affidavits filed in Tash Hepting et al. v. 
AT&T Corporation et al.,7 describe the NSA surveil-
lance architecture at the AT&T switching office in 
San Francisco. AT&T has acknowledged the authen-
ticity of the documents describing the layout and 
configuration for the secure room in its San Francisco 
office, which is where electronic surveillance took 
place.8 Our discussion is based on these documents 
and on affidavits submitted by two expert witnesses, 
Mark Klein (a technician in the AT&T San Francisco 
office)9 and J. Scott Marcus (a designer of large-scale 
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IP-based data networks, former CTO at GTE Inter-
networking and at Genuity, and former senior advisor 
for Internet Technology at the US Federal Commu-
nications Commission).10
Optical fiber carrying the inter-ISP peering traf-
fic associated with AT&T’s Common Backbone11 was 
“split,” dividing the signal so that 50 percent went to 
each output fiber (the weakened signal on each output 
fiber still contained sufficient information to allow 
reading the communications).12 One of the output fi-
bers was diverted to the secure room; the other carried 
communications on to AT&T’s switching equipment. 
The secure room contained Narus traffic analyzers 
and logic servers; Narus states that such devices are 
capable of real-time data collection (recording data 
for consideration) and capture at 10G bits per second 
(bps). Certain traffic was selected and sent over a ded-
icated line to a “central location.” The San Francisco 
office set up was one of many throughout the country, 
including in Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles, and San 
Diego.13 According to Marcus’s affidavit, the diverted 
traffic “represented all, or substantially all, of AT&T’s 
peering traffic in the San Francisco Bay area,”14 and 
thus, “the designers of the ... configuration made no 
attempt, in terms of location or position of the fiber 
split, to exclude data sources comprised primarily of 
domestic data.”15
Call detail records
Modern telecommunications allow the construction 
of smooth-running organizations that span the globe; 
telecommunications are the nervous systems of these 
organizations. The “reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States” aspect of the Protect Amer-
ica Act arguably changes the rules on the government’s 
use of call detail records (CDRs), which can be sur-
prisingly revelatory of relationships and organizational 
structure (although this data does not always reveal 
where communicating parties are physically located). 
It appears that the US government has real-time access 
to CDRs without need for a court order. 
CDRs are essentially the raw data for traditional 
phone bills. Phone companies build and maintain 
comprehensive databases of such information, which 
contain complete call traffic data: records of such 
transactional information as calling and called num-
bers for phone calls, IP addresses and user URIs in 
the case of voice-over IP (VoIP); SMTP headers for 
emails; location, time, and date of communications; 
call duration; and related information. To listen to 
an organization’s communications is to read its mind, 
and following just the pattern of its communications 
is a large step in this direction. CDRs provide a win-
dow into the past. Phone companies use such data 
for billing, engineering, marketing, and fraud detec-
US wiretap law
T hrough the decades, electronic surveillance has been effec-tive in both capturing and convicting criminals and spies, as 
well as in denying them and terrorists full use of modern com-
munications out of the fear of being eavesdropped, tracked, and 
caught. Although rarely mentioned, the latter is a particularly 
important side effect of electronic surveillance. But while there 
is no question that electronic surveillance can be extremely ef-
fective, there has always been tension between national security 
and privacy.
Prior to the Protect America Act, United States wiretapping 
law was essentially governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351), which regulat-
ed the procedure for wiretaps in criminal investigations, and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA; P.L. 95-511), which 
did the same for foreign intelligence surveillance. These laws and 
their later derivatives laid out clear and specific procedures for 
obtaining wiretap warrants, which, with very minor exceptions, 
specified the particular line (or particular IP address or email 
account) on which the tapping was to occur.1 Law enforcement 
obtained a warrant and sent this information to the communica-
tions provider, which installed the tap.
The US learned the hard way that oversight was critical if 
surveillance technologies were to be kept within legal bounds. 
During the Watergate era, the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities 
investigated 35 years of government electronic surveillance in 
the US, uncovering many abuses. These included wiretaps on 
congressional staff, Supreme Court Justices, Martin Luther King 
Jr. (in his case, sometimes for purely political purposes), as well 
as government investigations of such decidedly non-violent 
groups as the American Friends Service Committee, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the 
Women’s Strike for Peace. It was clear that the “national security” 
rationale for many of the wiretaps was not justified. FISA was 
passed in response to these issues; the requirements governing 
FISA wiretapping were lifted almost verbatim from the carefully 
crafted recommendations of the Senate committee report.2 
Some of these safeguards delimiting government surveillance 
were removed by the USA Patriot Act (arguably the most impor-
tant change the Patriot Act made in wiretapping law was modify-
ing the requirement that foreign intelligence be the “primary” 
purpose of a FISA tap to a “significant” purpose3).
The law was also clear in its exception: no warrant was 
required to intercept radio communications between persons in 
the US and persons abroad unless the government was inten-
tionally targeting a particular known US person who was in the 
US. This exception was viewed as a temporary one; the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report on the FISA legislation makes clear 
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tion. Unlike a wiretap or pen register, which provide, 
respectively, real-time access only to the content or 
number currently being dialed, a CDR database 
contains a wealth of data on previous communica-
tions. Thus, an interested government agency doesn’t 
need to have the proper legal authorization or tech-
nology in place before a call is made but may search 
the call detail database during the communication to 
determine a “community of interest”—the network 
of people with whom the suspect is in contact—as 
well as later, once a new target has been identified. 
For international and some purely domestic calls, two 
CDRs exist for each communication, one from the 
origination point—which could be an interface to 
another company—and one from the termination.
Although transactional information has historically 
been viewed as much less deserving of privacy protec-
tion than call content, in fact, access to CDRs can be a 
major privacy risk. Corinna Cortes and her colleagues 
at AT&T Shannon Labs showed, for example, that, 
even though the calling number had changed, it was 
possible to identify an individual caller from a 300-
Tbyte CDR database by simply looking at patterns 
of called numbers.16 While at Katholieke Universit-
eit Leuven, George Danezis related a story in which 
Intel researchers studying ambient Bluetooth activ-
ity to improve ad-hoc routing protocols issued staff 
members Bluetooth devices. One of the discoveries 
was that a pair of researchers were meeting nightly, 
a relationship that had not been previously known to 
the other lab members.17
CDRs can be used for targeting more detailed 
surveillance, such as wiretapping. The more tightly 
coupled CDR and content collection are, the more 
likely it is that, without regard to the intentions of the 
parties involved, content wiretapping will occur as a 
result of CDR information.
Difficulties in monitoring 
international Internet traffic
Monitoring international traffic requires an effective 
way to identify whether communication starts or ends 
outside the US. This is a surprisingly difficult problem 
to solve on today’s Internet. Perhaps even more sur-
prisingly, this is not an easy task on a telephone net-
work either. According to a 1998 National Academies 
study, “the underlying telephone network is unable to 
provide [caller ID] information with high assurance 
of authenticity.”18 (Or, to put it another way, although 
CDR is an amazingly effective guide to communica-
tions activity, the data can’t always provide real-time 
answers about a call’s location.) NSA has worked on 
the problem, and the agency even has a patent for using 
time latency to determine a communication’s location 
that interception of radio communications was to be considered 
separately.4 But separate legislation never came to pass, and the 
exception continued.
In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft proposed changing 
FISA procedures. The FISA Court, whose job it is to review FISA 
wiretapping warrant applications, was not pleased with this, in 
part because of mistakes that had occurred in earlier FISA applica-
tions. The court issued a report criticizing the proposal5 and the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) mishandling of the wall 
between foreign intelligence cases and criminal investigations: 
“In virtually every instance, the government’s misstatements and 
omissions in FISA applications and violations of the Court’s orders 
involved information sharing and unauthorized disseminations 
to criminal investigators and prosecutors.” An extremely impor-
tant check on government abuse is oversight. As the founders 
of the US  knew, another branch of government can provide the 
objectivity necessary for such an investigation. Public knowledge 
also matters. When the FISA court was dissatisfied with the Bush 
Administration’s actions  in 2002, it declassified its opinion,5 help-
ing to shape the later debate on the USA Patriot Act renewal and 
other administration requests for changes in the wiretap laws.
Some might argue that the excesses of surveillance in the 
1960s and ’70s were long ago, occurring during a period of 
domestic unrest and international tension. But government ex-
cesses in this realm continue. A recent report by the FBI Inspector 
General, for example, sharply criticized the bureau regarding its 
abuse of National Security Letters, “administrative” subpoenas 
that are issued with no judicial oversight and that require the 
recipient to turn over certain records. The Inspector General con-
cluded that FBI agents might have violated the law 3000 times 
since 2003 in their collection of telephone and financial records 
of US citizens and foreign nationals.6
References
D. Solove and M. Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law, Aspen Publishers, 
2003, pp. 323–341.
United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Op-
erations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976), Intelligence Ac-
tivities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report: Book II, Report 94-755, 
Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, 23 Apr. 1976, pp. 292–330.
W. Diffie and S. Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping 
and Encryption, updated and expanded edition, MIT Press, 2007, pp. 
280–285.
United States Senate, Committee of the Judiciary (1977), Legislative 
History P.L. 95-511 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Report 95-604, 
Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, 15 Nov. 1977, p. 34.
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum 
Opinion (as Corrected and Amended,) May 17, 2002, in United States 
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 2002, The USA PATRIOT Act in Prac-
tice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process, Hearing on 10 Sept. 2002, S. Hrg. 
107–947, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session.
Inspector General, US Federal Bureau of Investigation, A Review of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of the National Security Letters, 
Mar. 2007.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Communications Security
28	 ieee	seCurity	&	PrivaCy							n						January/February	2008
(US Patent # 6,947,978: Method for geolocating logi-
cal network addresses).
International traffic monitoring requires either 
limiting monitoring to links that carry only inter-
national traffic or filtering out any traffic transferred 
between two domestic hosts. The first approach seems 
easy if monitoring is limited to cable heads connect-
ing the US to other countries. The second approach 
also seems easy, by mapping the IP addresses of the 
sending and receiving hosts to their geographic loca-
tions. However, both approaches have limitations.
Although most traffic on international links travels 
to or from a foreign host, a small amount of domestic 
traffic traverses these links as well—for example, some 
domestic traffic travels through Canada and then back 
to the US due to the vagaries of Internet routing. 
(This is partially a result of a 1940s AT&T master plan 
that made the US, Canada, and most of the Carib-
bean one integrated country, with no cable heads, or 
even international gateways, between them.) As such, 
monitoring links at the US border, with the goal of 
warrantless tapping of international traffic, could lead 
to unintentional tapping of domestic traffic. Because 
these links operate at a very high speed, it is difficult 
to analyze measurement data as they are collected. 
Furthermore, Internet traffic does not necessarily fol-
low symmetric paths—the traffic from host A to host 
B does not necessarily traverse the same links as the 
traffic from B to A—so monitoring both ends of a 
conversation sometimes requires combining data col-
lected from multiple locations, making this type of 
monitoring difficult in practice.
Monitoring very close to the sending or receiving 
host ensures that both directions of the traffic are visi-
ble and that the link speeds are typically small enough 
for detailed data collection. But monitoring near the 
domestic endpoint would almost certainly capture 
a large amount of traffic exchanged with other US-
based hosts. To identify and filter the domestic traffic, 
a signals intelligence agency such as the NSA could 
map the remote host’s IP address to a country using 
registries that identify the institution that owns the IP 
address block. The problem is that these registries are 
notoriously incomplete and out of date. Instead, the 
NSA could use existing IP geolocation services (such 
as Quova, www.quova.com). Although such services 
are often accurate to a few tens of miles, errors of hun-
dreds of miles or more are not uncommon. As such, 
a host might easily look as though it resides on the 
opposite side of the border with another country, such 
as Mexico or Canada. 
Even if geolocation services are accurate, the 
source and destination addresses in the IP packet do 
not necessarily correspond to communicating hosts. 
Some VoIP services, such as Skype, routinely use relay 
nodes to enable calls between two hosts that could not 
otherwise communicate, due to a firewall or a Net-
work Address Translator (NAT), a device that enables 
multiple hosts on a private network to access the In-
ternet using a single public IP address. A relay node is 
a third machine that might reside in the same country 
as one, or both, of the other hosts, or in yet a third 
country. Depending on where traffic is monitored, 
the source or destination address can correspond to 
the relay node, rather than one of the communicating 
endpoints, complicating efforts to determine whether 
both endpoints are domestic. In addition, some us-
ers apply anonymization tools like Tor (The Onion 
Router) that intentionally hide source and destina-
tion addresses from packet sniffers. Whether traffic 
traverses a relay or an anonymizer, the monitor could 
capture erroneous IP addresses that do not correspond 
to the ultimate source and destination of the traffic.
Even if the traffic does not traverse a relay or ano-
nymizer, real-time association of an IP address with 
a particular person of interest is a difficult task. (We 
should note that EU member states consider email ad-
dresses, even when not associated with an IP address, 
personally identifiable information.) For example, an 
IP address might correspond to a NAT box so identi-
fying the particular host responsible for the traffic re-
quires access to transient information available only to 
the NAT box. Even in the absence of NAT boxes, the 
IP address of each end host can be assigned dynami-
cally through the Dynamic Host Configuration Pro-
tocol (DHCP). Mapping the IP address to a particular 
host may require DHCP logs from the local site, and 
these logs are often incorrect.19 Mapping from the host 
to a particular user is difficult if the machine is shared 
among many people, as at a cybercafe or an academic 
lab. In addition, mobile hosts such as laptops or PDAs 
frequently acquire new IP addresses.20
Even if the communicating endpoints can be ap-
propriately identified, determining what application 
they are running is difficult. (Knowing the applica-
tion helps determine whether the information will 
be useful; there is little foreign intelligence value in 
wiretapping a transmission of the latest Hollywood 
movie.) In the simplest case, applications are easily 
discernible from numerical identifiers (for example, 
port numbers) in data packets. However, some appli-
cations do not use well-known port numbers, and oth-
ers intentionally use port numbers normally reserved 
Even if the traffic does not traverse  
a relay or anonymizer, real-time association  
of an IP address with a particular person  
of interest is difficult.
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for other applications in order to evade detection; for 
example, some peer-to-peer file sharing applications 
use port 80, the conventional port for Web traffic. 
(There is active research in determining the type of 
traffic using other information.) Such analysis is diffi-
cult to perform in real time on high-speed links, such 
as the links connecting the US to other countries. In 
addition, a malicious party trying to avoid detection 
might intentionally pad or jitter packets to evade de-
tection, adding further complexity to an already diffi-
cult problem. Finally, some applications such as Skype 
encrypt data, making it difficult to extract meaning-
ful information about the content of the communica-
tion between end hosts.
The real problem is that these difficulties are in-
trinsic to the Internet’s basic design. Additional issues 
arise when interworking VoIP with other telephony 
services, such as the public-switched telephone net-
work. An international call might terminate in the US 
and then use VoIP the rest of the way (and vice versa), 
requiring joint analysis across two kinds of communi-
cation networks. The many difficulties in accurately 
distinguishing domestic and foreign communication 
make it unlikely that an intelligence agency could 
avoid tapping domestic calls.
Risks
Surveillance technology is an “architected security 
breach”21 into a communications network and thus 
a risky business on which to embark. (Telecommuni-
cations carriers must “listen in” on communications 
for quality control. Intercept architectures are, how-
ever, more complicated; they have to target particular 
individuals without leaving a trace. Monitoring the 
network for quality control is much simpler because 
monitoring can pick up any conversation and is al-
lowed to fail more often.) Two situations illuminate 
different reasons for our concern.
Let’s go back to a point we brought up earlier. The 
Greek wiretapping case began in summer 2004, just 
before the Olympic Games in Athens. More than 
100 cell phones belonging to the prime minister and 
ministers of defense, foreign affairs, justice, and public 
order—as well as opposition members in the Greek 
parliament—were wiretapped through the activation 
of wiretapping modules in the network’s telephone 
exchange switches, capabilities that were supposed to 
be invoked only with legal authorization. The wire-
tapping capability had been provided in a system up-
date, but because the Greek Vodaphone network had 
not purchased the wiretapping capability, the system 
lacked the management software that installed and 
logged wiretaps. Not only did the intruders turn on 
the network’s wiretapping capability, they also in-
stalled a rootkit that hid any activity of their own soft-
ware updates. Each time there was a communication 
on one of the tapped phones, a duplicate communica-
tion was sent to one of 14 cell phones in the network, 
all of which were prepaid, anonymous accounts. 
While we know private communications at the high-
est levels of the Greek government were wiretapped 
for 10 months, who did it remains unknown.1
The US has also experienced difficulties with 
communications surveillance systems. Under the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act (P.L. 100-667), the US Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) was responsible for determining techni-
cal specifications for wiretapping built into switches of 
digital telephone networks.   DCS 3000, an FBI suite 
of systems for collecting and managing data from wire-
taps for criminal investigations, was designed to meet 
those requirements. Recently released FBI documents 
reveal serious problems in the system’s implementa-
tion.22 Its auditing system was primitive, surprising for 
a system intended for evidence collection. The system 
has no unprivileged user IDs, relying on passwords 
rather than token-based or biometric authentication, 
and even uses an outdated hashing algorithm (MD5 
appears in a 2007 “system security plan,”23 several 
years after Chinese researchers found serious problems 
with this already weak hashing algorithm). Most seri-
ously, the system relied on a single shared login, rather 
than a login per authorized user. The system’s ability 
to audit user behavior depended entirely on following 
proper processes, including using a manual log sheet 
to show who was using the system at a given time. 
Remote access—in an insecure fashion—is permitted 
from other DCS 3000 nodes, making the system vul-
nerable to insider attacks. These are a real risk: recall 
that the most damaging spy in FBI history, Robert 
Hanssen, abused his authorized access to internal FBI 
computer systems to steal information and track prog-
ress of the investigation aimed at him.
The problems in the DCS 3000 implementation 
illustrate the risks in building a communications sur-
veillance system. We do not know whether DCS 3000 
was merely poorly implemented or whether it was 
poorly specified. What were the requirements on the 
FBI system? Did they include full auditing and full 
user identity? What were the project’s goals? Were the 
designers required to meet all requirements or goals? 
These are questions that should have been asked of 
the DCS 3000 designers—and should be asked of any 
builder of a communications surveillance system.
Although the NSA has extensive experience in 
building surveillance systems, that does not mean 
things cannot go wrong. When you build a system to 
spy on yourself, you entail an awesome risk. In design-
ing a system to satisfy the needs of the Protect America 
Act, the risk is made worse by four phenomena: 
removal of a protective role provided by communi-•
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cation carriers in all previous interception programs 
within the US communication system. This protec-
tive role was the result of the specificity required in 
wiretap warrants. 
placing the system properly within the US rather 
than at US borders;
likelihood that the system will be built out of pieces 
previously used abroad, which runs the risk that 
opponents are already familiar with the equipment 
via intelligence-sharing agreements or capture of 
equipment; and
use of CDRs, originally built for network develop-
ment purposes, in an entirely new way involving 
“customers” outside the phone company.
These architectural decisions facilitate three dis-
tinct types of problems: 
system capture to enable spying on US traffic;
system defeat by using information learned from 
foreign examples to defeat selection and filtering 
strategies; and 
system spoofing by similar means.
All of these can be used not only to make the sur-
veillance system less effective, but also to turn it into 
a tool for capturing communications that are not 
implicated in any illegal activity—endangering both 
security and privacy. We see several specific risks as 
a result.
Risk of exploitation by opponents. A system that ac-
cesses domestic communications necessarily poses a 
greater direct risk to the communications of Ameri-
cans than a surveillance system fielded overseas. To 
avoid foreign familiarity with its operation, commu-
nication security equipment is not often shared with 
allies. However, engineering economy reuses systems 
previously fielded abroad; thus, both allies and op-
ponents are likely to be familiar with US surveillance 
equipment. Is there a risk that knowledge of the sur-
veillance system acquired by studying equipment 
outside the US will be applied to defeating or sub-
verting similar equipment deployed within the US? 
Is the NSA designing sufficiently robust mechanisms 
to assure complete control of the filtering and selec-
tion mechanisms? 
Even prior to the Protect America Act, US com-
munications were vulnerable to surveillance, but 
building signals intelligence systems is expensive. The 
system designed as a result of the Protect America Act 
must not reduce foreign powers’ difficulty in gaining 
access to US communications. Can the communica-
tions of US persons be tapped without increasing the 
risk that these communications will be exploited by 
others without authorization to do so? 
•
•
•
•
•
•
Removal of safeguards by communications carriers. 
What risks are introduced by leaving a single entity 
in charge of selection and retention decisions? “Two-
person control” would be prudent—for example, 
control by two authorized parties who understand 
how a system should work. In its absence, any process 
such as the one apparently embodied in the AT&T 
San Francisco switching office (in which communi-
cations are diverted to an NSA safe room and then 
collected according to rules determined by the intel-
ligence agency) provides little recourse in cases where 
mistakes are made.
Lack of inherent technical minimization of traffic. 
Intercepting at switches or routers creates unnecessary 
risks because the switches handle domestic as well as 
foreign communications. This risk, although distinct 
from the risk of exploitation by opponents, feeds into 
it; potential overcollection of purely domestic traffic 
increases the value of targeting the US access and col-
lection system.
Domestic traffic penetrating too deeply into the 
NSA collection system. Collection outside the US 
inherently filters out most “US-person traffic” before 
it gets to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade. Does the 
design of the expanded surveillance system eliminate 
domestic traffic early and as effectively? This is more 
of a privacy risk than a security one, although insider 
attacks make it a security risk as well.
CDR information. CDR systems were originally in-
tended to be used by telephone company employees 
for determining customer usage patterns and thus an-
ticipating future needs. It is a truism in the security 
field that problems frequently occur when new uses 
are found for old systems, given that the protection 
mechanisms and system architecture were never de-
signed for the extended uses. Will new vulnerabilities 
be created when copies of the CDR data are sent to 
law enforcement or intelligence agencies? It is impos-
sible to give a definitive answer, but the past history of 
such changes does not leave us sanguine.
Risk reduction
There are also ways in which the Protect America Act 
enables an architecture that could reduce risk. Being 
able to place equipment on US soil reduces the need 
to place equipment abroad. Beyond the direct secu-
rity risks to equipment, which could be alleviated by 
high-quality shielding and tamper resistance, there is 
an intrinsic risk. When intercept capability is installed 
in other countries’ communication systems, the privi-
lege must be paid for—often by sharing information. 
Host countries might demand not only a share of the 
intelligence take—whether this could ever pose a 
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threat to US communications is hard to assess—but 
also inspection authority over the installation and in-
formation about techniques. Intercept facilities hosted 
by foreign governments are expected not to spy on the 
host countries themselves. However, the charge that 
the surveillance facilities are doing so is often made, 
and the host countries quite reasonably insist on tak-
ing measures aimed at preventing this.
New security risks
Security risks are exacerbated by the direction of the 
Internet’s development. The Internet is currently a 
network with only millions of devices connected to 
it, but the world is rapidly moving to a situation in 
which billions of small, resource-limited devices such 
as RFID tags and sensors will use networks for com-
munication and control. While many of these devices 
will be on local area networks, many will use the In-
ternet.24 Any future surveillance architectures must 
take such growth and directions into account.
Implicit in the FISA update was the need to pro-
tect the US against non-state actors, who have indeed 
shown themselves to be adept at using the Internet 
to communicate. Some of the tools provided for 
by the Protect America Act could in fact aid in the 
disruption of various nefarious plots. But building 
surveillance technology into a communications infra-
structure creates risk of penetration by trusted insid-
ers, foreign powers, and non-state actors (with trusted 
insiders being the greatest threat). Disrupting attacks 
by non-state actors could be a short-term gain, but 
surveillance architectures rarely go away. The dangers 
created by the Protect America Act present a long-
term risk. (This is exemplified by the exploit in the 
Greek wiretapping case, which relied on an earlier 
software version that included wiretapping capabili-
ties but not the auditing system.) 
The Protect America Act, a law enacted in haste, 
holds the possibility of a vast increase in the number 
of Americans whose communications and communi-
cation patterns will be studied. The surveillance pro-
vides access to US communications, a target of great 
value. The US could build for its opponents some-
thing that would be too expensive for them to build 
for themselves: a system that lets them see the US’s 
intelligence interests, a system that could tell them 
how to thwart those interests, and a system that might 
be turned to intercept the communications of Ameri-
can citizens and institutions. It is critical that the new 
surveillance system neither enable exploitation of US 
communications by unauthorized parties nor permit 
abuse by authorized ones.
Recommendations
The change from a system that taps particular lines on 
receipt of a wiretap order specifying those lines to one 
that sorts through transactional data in real time and 
selects communications of interest is massive. Where 
interception occurs and how the data sources (CDRs, 
traffic, other information) are combined and used will 
not only affect how powerful a tool warrantless wire-
tapping is, but will also affect how likely the system is 
to pick up purely domestic communications. In build-
ing a communications surveillance system itself—and 
saving its enemies the effort—the US government is 
creating three distinct serious security risks: danger of 
exploitation of the system by unauthorized users, dan-
ger of criminal misuse by trusted insiders, and danger 
of misuse by US government agents. How should the 
US mitigate these risks? 
Minimization matters
Allowing collection of calls on US territory neces-
sarily entails greater access to the communications of 
US persons. An architecture that minimizes collec-
tion of communications lowers the risk of exploitation 
by outsiders and exposure to insider attacks. Traffic 
should be collected at international cable heads rather 
than at tandem switches or backbone routers, which 
also carry purely domestic traffic. Although intercep-
tion at the cable heads will help minimize collection, 
it is not sufficient in and of itself. Intercepted traffic 
should be studied (by geolocation and any other avail-
able techniques) to determine whether it comes from 
non-targeted US persons and, if so, discard it before 
any further processing is done. It should be funda-
mental to the system’s design that the combination of 
interception location and selection methods minimiz-
es the collection of purely domestic traffic.
Architecture matters
Using real-time transactional information to intercept 
high-volume traffic makes architectural choices criti-
cal. Robust auditing and logging systems must be part 
of the system design. Communication providers, who 
have technical expertise and decades of experience 
protecting the security and privacy of their customers’ 
communications, should have an active role in both 
design and operation. Thus, “two-person control” is 
appropriate for this situation.
Oversight matters
The new system is likely to operate differently from 
It is critical that the new surveillance 
system neither enable exploitation of US 
communications by unauthorized parties nor 
permit abuse by authorized ones.
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previous wiretapping regimes and will likely use new 
technologies for purposes of targeting wiretaps. There 
should be appropriate oversight by publicly account-
able bodies. While the details might remain classified, 
there should be a publicly known system for handling 
situations when mistakes are made. To assure inde-
pendence, the overseeing authority should be as far 
removed from the intercepting authority as practical. 
To guarantee that electronic surveillance is effective 
and free of abuse and that minimization is in place 
and working appropriately, it is necessary that there 
be frequent, detailed reports on the system’s func-
tioning. Of particular concern is the real-time use of 
CDR for targeting content, which must neither be 
abused by the US government nor allowed to fall into 
unauthorized hands. For full oversight, such review 
should be done by a branch of government different 
from the one conducting the surveillance. We recom-
mend frequent ex post facto review of CDR-based 
real-time targeting. The oversight mechanism must 
include outside reviewers who regularly ask, “What 
has gone wrong lately—regardless of whether you re-
covered—that you have not yet told us about?”
U S communications security has always been fun-damental to national security. The surveillance 
architecture implied by the Protect America Act will, 
by its very nature, capture some purely domestic com-
munications, risking the very national security that 
the act is supposed to protect. In an age so dependent 
on communication, the loss could well be greater than 
the gain. To prevent greater threats to US national 
security, it is imperative that proper security—includ-
ing minimization, robust control, and oversight—be 
built into the system from the start. If security cannot 
be assured, then any surveillance performed using that 
system will be inherently fraught with risks that are 
fundamentally unacceptable. 
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